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Abstract
Bell’s theorem is based on three assumptions: realism, locality, and measurement
independence. The third assumption is identified by Bell as linked to the freedom
of choice hypothesis. He holds that ultimately the human free will can ensure the
measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions
for supporting this third assumption are known in the literature as “freedom-of-
choice loophole” (FOCL). In a recent publication, Abellán et al [2018] address
this  problem  and  follow  this  same  strategy  embraced  by  Bell  [2004].
Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of
philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among
philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, Bell´s solution would not
be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption
of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In
this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that
this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that BigBell Test (Abellán et
al. [2018]) can in fact close the loophole. 
Keywords: Bell’s inequality, free will, Kant, agency 
1. Introduction
Performing a Bell test is not a simple task. Bell’s theorem (Bell [1964]) is intended to show
that  local  realist  theories  are  not  adequate  for  describing  quantum  phenomena.  To  reach  an
experimental  result  that  allows  such  broad  conclusions,  it  is  necessary  that  the  experiments
rigorously fulfill two technical conditions: (i) speed and efficiency in the detection of measures and
(ii) the permanence of entangled states that maintain their coherence even when separated at great
distances. In addition, it is also necessary to presuppose a third condition, which is the unpredictable
measurement settings. This third condition requires that the measurements settings imply random
choices that should be statistically independent of any influence of hidden variables (Abellán et al
[2018]).  The  first  experimental  implementations  (Aspect,  Grangier  and  Roger  [1982];  Aspect,
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2Dalibard, and Roger [1982];  Weihs et al [1998]; Ou and Mandel [1988]; Shih and Alley [1988];
Tapster  et  al  [1994])  show  agreement  with  quantum  theory,  but  were  not  able  to  ensure  the
necessary preconditions for the tests. In these cases, the Bell test goal has not been not reached,
since  the  same  experimental  results  can  be  explained  by  classical  theories  using  local  hidden
variables. This circumstances of incomplete experimental conditions are referred in the literature as
“loopholes.” There are different kinds of loopholes, most of them are related to technical issues. The
detection efficiency loophole and the locality loophole were recently overcome in experimental
settings (Hensen et al [2015]; Giustina et al [2015]; Shalm et al [2015]). 
The freedom-of-choice loophole (FOCL) is related to the assumption that the measurement
setting variables (x  and  y) are statistically independent of the hidden variables. Usually, in Bell
tests, the measurement settings are determined by a device, a physical randomizer (Hensen et al
[2015]; Rosenfeld et al [2017]; Abellán et al [2015]; Fürst et al [2010]; Scheidla et al [2010]) that
would be responsible for the required statistical independence. However, in classical terms, we can
say that the randomizers have a causal past because they are physical devices, and consequently the
setting variables x and y have a common causal past. In other words, we can say that the backward
light cone of the setting variables x and y overlaps. The fact that the measurement setting variables
x and  y have a causal past in common, entitles one to assume that a hidden variable can be a
common cause for them. To ignore this possibility would be to assume that “Bell’s theorem applies
only  to  a  hybrid  universe  in  which  hidden  variables  determine  only  part  of  the  outcomes  of
experiments.” (Brans, C. [1988]). This means that hidden variables would determine the measurable
outcomes (A and B), but not the setting variables x and y.
Efforts to close FOCL have been made  by different experimental groups.  Scheidla et al.
[2010]  and  Shalm  et  al,  [2015] claim  that  they  have  fulfilled  this  task  by  ensuring  that  the
measurement setting choices are separated in a spacelike way from the event of the creation of the
particles. They made the strong assumption that the hidden variable (λ) is created together with the
entangled pair of particles. Therefore, the spacelike separation between the particle pair creation
event and the measurement setting choices of the variables  x and  y  would ensure the statistical
independence between x and y, on one side, and λ, on the other. 
There are also attempts to tighten FOCL by constraining the space-time volume. In these
attempts the possible causal relationship between the measurement setting variables (x and y) and
the hidden variable (λ) could have occurred (Rauch et al [2018]; Handsteiner et al [2017]) only in a
very remote past. This is  done through experimental setups that allow the measurement setting
choices to be made through degrees of freedom of photons emitted by distant stars. In this way, the
experiment “pushes the origin of the measurement settings considerably deeper into cosmic history”
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available for establishing the causal relationship between the settings variables x and y, and λ.  
However, Abellán et al [2018] hold that even the strong restrictions established by Dominik
Rauch  et  al.  [2018] would  not  be  sufficient  to  close  FOCL,  since  in  all  these  attempts,  the
measurement settings continue to be defined by physical objects, as in the case of photons emitted
by distant stars. In their words, “while still requiring a physical assumption, and thus not closing the
FOCL, this strategy tightens the loophole in various ways” (Abellán et al [2018]). The assumption
taken by  Abellán  et  al  [2018] is  that  the  measurement  settings  can  be considered  legitimately
independent of λ only if they are the result of human choices. For only in this situation is the link
between the measurable variables and λ excluded. This idea goes back to the famous remark made
by Bell in the last section of his article “The theory of local beables” (Bell [2004]): 
It has been assumed (in deriving Bell’s theorem) that the settings of instruments are in some
sense free variables - say at the whim of experimenters - or in any case not determined in the
overlap of the backward light cones. 
Bell and the authors of Big Bell Test (Abellán et al [2018]) support the idea that human choices are
free, therefore, suitable to close the FOCL. Therefore, in the Big Bell Test, since the measurement
setting variables in the tests were defined by human choices, the authors claim to have closed the
FOCL. 
By accepting the free will choice as the only way to close the FOCL, the authors of Big Bell
test  implicitly  introduce  into  the  process  a  different  kind  of  causality,  aka  causality  through
freedom, that cannot be assimilated to the natural causal chain (natural causality). In philosophical
terms, they tacitly admit that physical events can be caused either by natural causes or by human
freedom. In the first case, the effect has a cause that was caused by another cause. In the second
case, the effect has a cause that was not caused by any empirical cause and, in this sense, one can
say that this cause is free. Thus, according to this view, the variable  λ could be considered as a
possible cause of any physical event,  e.g.,  processes in random number generators, emission of
photons in stars, etc., but not a cause of human choices. This philosophical thesis was admitted by
Bell and by the authors of Big Bell test to be sufficient close the FOCL, and so to ensure the
conditions of validity of Bell’s theorem. At this point, it becomes clear that the initial expectation of
transforming the philosophical debate between Einstein and Bohr on the incompleteness of quantum
theory into a purely experimental investigation was not accomplished by Bell. 
The philosophical debate on free will can be traced back to Augustine [2011], for whom the
possibility of human freedom in presence of the foreknowledge of God was a central issue. In the
XVIII century, with the advent of Newtonian physics, this debate acquires new contours. The free
will thesis seemed to be opposed to the determinism of the laws of physics. In this sense, human
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according to strict laws of nature. The philosophers who hold that universal natural determinism
and freedom are mutually metaphysically inconsistent are classified as incompatibilists, whereas
those who deny this possibility and assert the consistency of universal natural determinism and
freedom are known as compatibilists.
However, the simple negation of determinism is not enough to hold a coherent position in
favor of the free will assumption. If every event were to result from a random process, then human
choices would have to result from a random process too, and thus they would have no agential
causal source. If human choices have no agential causal source, they cannot be effect of human free
will. Thus, in a universally indeterministic world, decisions and choices would not be caused by
human free will because they would be random events and not have an agential source. Therefore,
indeterminism is also a threat to human free will. Nevertheless, the case of “superindeterminism,”
i.e.,  universal  natural  indeterminism,  which  deny  both  the  determinism  and  the  causality,  is
excluded in the context of Bell experiments, which try to show precisely the inadequacy of causal
theories applied to quantum phenomena, whether they are deterministic or probabilistic. 
Conversely, if human choices were to be completely determined by natural causality, then
free will would be an illusion. However, it is not necessary to assume that this natural causality is
deterministic.  We  can  postulate  a  kind  of  “compatibilistic  incompatibilism”  between  natural
probabilistic  causality  (not  deterministic)  and free  will.  The  possibility  of  human choice  being
determined  by  a  natural  causality  (not  necessarily  deterministic)  is  often  identified  as  a
“superdeterministic” position (Abellán et al [2018]). Nevertheless, Bell and the authors of Big Bell
test  hold  that  any kind  of  superdeterministic  position  cannot  be experimentally  tested.  In  their
words: “the theory that the entire experiment, including choices and outcomes, is pre-determined by
initial conditions is known as superdeterminism [and] superdeterminism cannot be tested” (Abellán
et al [2018]). Thus, they assume in the experiment, although not explicitly, a philosophical position
according to which freedom and nature belongs to two different domains. The first one is essentially
human and agential,  and the second one essentially physical and non-agential.  It  is only in the
domain of essentially physical events that the concept of natural causality can be applied. In the
domain of human action, the choices are free. 
In this paper, we will show that the tacit philosophical commitment of Big Bell experiment
is better understood in Kantian terms. We will therefore make explicit the Kantian philosophical
basis of the central hypothesis of the experiment carried out by Abellán et al [2018], according to
which human choices are free. For that, we will take into account a certain interpretation of Kant’s
theory of human agency defended among others by Henry Allison [1990] and Maria Borges [2019].
It is not the purpose of this work to go into detail concerning the discussions between Kantian
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is consistent to  the Kantian interpretation that attributes to the agent the power to start a causal
series spontaneously, free from the influences of any previous events. In Kant’s philosophy, natural
causality allows us to understand the nature as subject to laws which hold universally in nature and
give it a predictable character. In this sense, every event is preceded by a cause which generates a
causal  chain in  accordance with a  rule.  However,  that  is  not  the only kind of  causality  that  is
operating in the empirical world. We need to presuppose a causality through freedom according to
which the power of choice of the human agent has empirical causal efficacy and can initiate a series
as a spontaneous cause that is uncaused by any earlier event. Therefore, the idea that human choices
are free and have causal efficiency with respect to natural objects of nature is built into the central
hypothesis of  Abellán et al [2018] and it also finds support in Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s
theory of human free agency.  
2. The Theorem
In a  traditional  Bell  experiment a  pair  of entangled particles are  spatially separated and
measured by two observers, conventionally called Alice and Bob. The variables  x and  y are the
setting variables that describe the possible measurement settings that can be performed by them
respectively.  The  variables  a and  b represent  the  measurement  outcomes  of  the  observables
associated to x and y.
Bell’s theorem imposes restrictions on the probability P(a,b|x,y) through assumptions about
the causal structure that represents the physical system in a Bell experiment. The conditions are (i)
local causality, and (ii) measurement independence. “Local causality” refers to the assumption that
the value of the variable a (b) is the joint effect of a hidden variable λ and the setting variable x (y). 
The experiments performed by two observers – Alice and Bob – are space-like separated
events, therefore a and b  are statistically independent given λ, x  and y. Also,  a (b) is statistically
independent of y(x). Or in mathematical terms: P(a,b|x,y,λ) = P(a|x,λ) P(b|y,λ).
The measurement independence condition states that the setting variables are independent of
λ. It can be written as P(x,y|λ) = P(x,y) which is equivalent to P(λ|x,y) = P(λ). 
Using the assumptions of local causality and measurement independence one can write the
conditional probability P(a,b|x,y) as:
P(a,b|x,y) = ∫dλ P(a,b|x,y,λ)P(λ|x,y) = ∫dλ P(a|x,λ)P(b|y,λ)P(λ)                              (1)
 
If  P(a|x,λ) and  P(b|y,λ) can assume only the values 0 or 1, the hidden variable theory is
deterministic. In this case, the value of the variable a(b) can be precisely known when x(y), λ are
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deterministic  causal  hidden  variable  theory  which  allows  that  P(a|x,  λ) and  P(b|y,  λ) assume
intermediate values. The assumptions will give the same result shown in equation (1). Accorging to
Bell’s theorem, therefore, deterministic and non-deterministic hidden variables theories (HVT) are
equivalent. Since deterministic HVT are more restrictive, in this essay we will focus on  random
HVT, and consequently, the causal relations among variables are also in the domain of probabilistic
natural causality.   
The predictions of quantum mechanics are not compatible with the separable form of P(a,b|
x,y) in Equation (1). This incompatibility can be experimentally tested. However, the assumptions
of locality and measurement independence must be guaranteed in the experiment. It has been shown
(Hall [2011]; Degorre et al [2005];  Hall [2010]; Brans [1988]) that if one of the assumptions is
relaxed, it is possible to reproduce statistics of quantum states within a hidden variable model. 
On the one hand, in order  to ensure locality  one must  deal with technical  issues in  the
experimental setup. The measurements a and the setting variable x have to be space-like separated
from b. On the other hand, there is no agreement among physicists on the necessary conditions for
ensuring the measurement independence condition (MIC). The problems involved are beyond the
technical issues. Additional properties of the hidden variables are considered in experimental setups
that aim to ensure MIC. As mentioned above, this situation of incomplete experimental conditions
related to measurement independence is known as the “freedom-of-choice loophole” (FOCL). 
The equivalence between the conditional probabilities P(x,y|λ)=P(x,y)$ and $P(λ|x,y)=P(λ)
given in the MIC points to two different causal relations among λ, x and y. In the first, λ cannot be
the cause of the setting variables x and y. In the second, x and y cannot be the cause of λ. In this
essay, we follow Abellán et al. [2018] and hold that FOCL is related only to the first relation. The
second applies to the locality loophole. 
Even though the three assumptions are all necessary for a Bell test, the first experimental
implementations were performed without any concern for MIC. According to Aspect, Dalibard, and
Roger  [1982],  the  setting  variables  x and  y were  chosen  into  the  backward  light  cone  of  the
entangled pair creation event. This allows for the possibility of causal relations among the setting
variables and λ. For Weihs et al. [1998], the setting variables were chosen in the future light cone of
the emission event. In this case,  x and  y could have been caused by  λ. In both situations, it was
assumed that λ must have been created at least at the same time as the entangled pair. Thus, in these
earlier experiments the FOCL was left open.
In  recent  Bell’s  inequality  experiments,  the  authors  claim that  FOCL was closed.  Their
presuppositions can be roughly divided into two groups. In the first,  Scheidla et  al.  [2010] and
Shalm et al. [2015] presuppose that the hidden variables are generated together with the entangled
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of the measurement settings is ensured, one can as a consequence assume that λ is not a cause of x
and y. In the second, Hensen et al. [2015; 2016] presuppose that the measurement setting variables
x and y have no causal past. 
In the first group, the assumption that λ is generated together with the entangled particles is
a strong and additional assumption about hidden variables that is not present in the derivation of
Bell’s inequality. The problem is that this additional hypothesis imposes a kind of restriction that
makes these experiments not instances of violations of Bell inequalities in a general way, as they are
supposed to be, but only in a very specific way, that is, in the case in which λ is generated only in a
particular moment. The problem with the second kind of experiments is that the choices of settings
x and  y are  done  by  a  physical  device  (a  randomizer).  Therefore,  as  a  physical  device,  it  is
submitted to the causality principle. So this central assumption in the second kind of experiments
leaves the FOCL open. 
Abellán et al [2018] argue that it  is not possible to close FOCL “while still  requiring a
physical assumption” about the choice of x and y. Following the famous argument by Bell in (Bell
[2004]), they hold that FOCL can be closed only if measurement setting variables are defined by
human choices. Based on this argument, they performed the Big Bell Test in five continents, and
twelve laboratories, using photons, single atoms, atomic ensembles and superconducting devices. A
significant part of the scientific community specializing in the field of nonlocality was involved in
this  test.  For  the  first  time,  human  choices  (from  100,000  volunteers)  were  used  to  select
measurement  settings  in a Bell  test.  The magnitude of this  collaboration (more than a hundred
authors signed a single paper) shows that the scientific community is indeed concerned about the
impossibility of closing FOCL using randomizers (physical devices) or any other kind of physical
object. 
An important question arises: why are human choices preferable to any kind of physical
process for close FOCL? Although this question is not explicitly answered in (Abellán et al [2018]),
the authors explicitly say that events “requiring a physical assumption” cannot close FOCL. The
Bigbell Test requires thus two strong assumptions. First, since every physical event has a causal
past, one cannot ensure that  λ does not belong to it. And second, since human choices are not an
empirical causal process, and therefore λ cannot be a cause of them, they are the only alternative for
closing FOCL.
3. Empirical Causality vs. Human Causality Through Freedom 
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order  to  support  the  implicit  assumption  in  (Abellán  et  al  [2018]),  according to  which  human
choices are independent of λ. For this purpose, it is necessary to distinguish between the causality
that regulates physical processes (which we will call merely physical causality) and the causality
associated with human decisions (which we will call human causality through freedom). The first
presupposes that the connection between cause and effect is constituted as a change in which “the
apprehension of  one  thing  (that  which  happens)  follows  that  of  the  other  (which  precedes)  in
accordance with a rule” (Kant, KrV, A193/B238). Cause and effect are both merely physical events
and  consequently  we can  think  in  λ as  a  merely  physical  cause  of  a  later  effect.  The  second
presupposes that the cause of a physical effect has its origin not in a merely physical event but in
the human arbitrium, i.e., the human will, or “power of choice” (Willkür) In this case, since λ is a
physical variable,  it  is not a part of the causal chain triggered by the human  arbitrium.  This is
because the cause of a physical effect in such case is not determined by any physical variable but by
a human action.
In  his  famous  Critical  program,  these  two  kinds  of  causality  emerge  from  the  basic
distinction adopted by Kant between nature and freedom. In Kant’s theory, the term “nature” refers
to the set of spatiotemporal objects of experience that are subject to rules given a priori. Physical
causality  is  one of these rules.  Contrary to common sense,  causality  in  Kantian terms is  not a
condition  of  a  mind  independent  world,  but  instead  a  condition  imposed  by  our  faculty  of
understanding. Therefore, physical causality is one of the rules we use to represent appearances, and
not a property of a mind independent world. Experience is not an event independent of the subject
but instead constituted by the subject. The revolution brought about by this new approach in the
field of metaphysics was of course compared by Kant, in the Preface to the second edition or B of
his  Critique of Pure Reason,  to the Copernican revolution in the natural sciences.  But whereas
Copernicus moved the Earth from the center of the universe to the periphery of our solar system,
circling the Sun, Kant’s theory moves the subject from the periphery of knowledge to the epistemic
center, a place previously occupied by the object.
The second kind of causality, that which is not empirical, does not belong to nature but
instead is grounded in human freedom. Contrary to the realm of nature, freedom is not conditioned
by spatiotemporal objects of experience and therefore it is not restricted to the laws that strictly
govern appearances.  Causality  through freedom, as spontaneous,  is  able  to  start  a  causal  series
without being itself caused by previous physical events. Kant establishes a cognitive boundary that
limits the merely physical causality to the empirical objects which are mechanically conceived. This
allows the creation of a conceptual space unrestricted by such causality. Because this conceptual
space does not belong to the realm of appearances, or phenomena, Kant needs to postulate another
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appearances  but  instead  to  the  conceptual  space  of  noumena.  Nevertheless,  causality  through
freedom can start a causal series in a physical space. Therefore, according to Kant, the distinction
between  nature  as  phenomenal  and  freedom  as  noumenal  is  necessary  for  guaranteeing  the
possibility of the second kind of causality without also denying the existence of physical causality.
When applied  to  the  rational  human agent,  the  distinction  between nature  and freedom
seems to result in an inconsistency. On the one hand, the rational human agent belongs to the set of
appearances because, as a human animal, it is a spatiotemporal object of experience. Therefore, it is
subject to empirical causality. On the other hand, the rational human agent is taken to have the
ability to initiate a causal series spontaneously, without being determined by empirical causality. To
overcome this apparent inconsistency, Kant presents a detailed theory about the dual “character” of
rational human agency. The rational human agent has an “empirical character,” which is subject to
natural causality, and also an “intelligible character,” which is able to spontaneously choose the
course of its actions. 
Thus  dual  character  theory  applies  specifically  to  the  rational  human  agent’s  will.  The
empirical  character  of  the  will  supports  a  psychological  causal  explanation  for  the  agent’s
performance,  according  to  in  which  the  agent’s  choices  and  actions  are,  to  a  certain  degree,
predictable.  The agent’s  desires,  inclinations,  and beliefs  are  psychological  factors  that  allow a
certain degree of predictability, hence one can take these factors to be as the empirical causes of
choices and actions. This empirical notion of causality underling the relation between psychological
factors and human behaviors can be thought as being not of the same kind as the physical causality
but as a kind of natural causality that has a causal history. From this perspective, one can conceive
in terms of a natural causality this empirical character of the will. If human choices were all defined
only by this empirical character of the will, we might think that ultimately human choices would be
determined by a physical variable like  λ.  This is because psychological causality being empirical
presupposes has a causal history. In this case one cannot ensure that a physical cause, such as λ, is
independent  of  psychological  factors  .  If  that  were  the  case,  then  the  experiment  proposed by
Abellán et al [2018] test based on empirical character of human choice would not guarantee the
closing of the loophole (FOCL).
In Kantian terms, the causality associated with the empirical character is not sufficient to
determine the will of the rational agent. According to Kant, the choice is a deliberative process of
reasoning in which the association of ideas and concepts that guide the human action requires a
degree of independence from empirical causes. This presupposes a spontaneity of reason for starting
a causal series which, in turn, was not determined by any previous natural cause. In this sense, it is
necessary to assume a freedom of the rational agent in determining his choices and actions triggered
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by these choices. Kant characterizes this free character of the human will, which is independent of
empirical causality,  as “intelligible.” By means of the intelligible character of the will,  one can
explain the choices and acts of a rational agent as effects of a different kind of cause that is not itself
subject to the rules of empirical causality, whether merely physical or empirically psychological.
Kant call this “causality through freedom.”
Henry Allison uses what he calls the “Incorporation Thesis” to support the presence of the
dual  character  of  the will  in  Kant’s  philosophy.  According to  Allison’s interpretation of  Kant’s
theory of agency, the choices and actions of a rational agent are yielded by the incorporation of
motives, like desires, inclinations, moral principles, etc., as reasons. The motives are presented to
the  rational  human  agent,  who  deliberately,  self-consciously,  and  spontaneously  decides  to
incorporate them as reasons or choice and action. The incorporation thesis allows us to identify the
human power of choice as “arbitrium liberum” and not as “brutum” (Kant, KrV, A535/B562). In the
animal power of choice, based on arbitrium brutum, sensible stimuli are causes of actions. If the
human power of choice were an arbitrium brutum, then the choices and actions of a rational human
agent would be caused by empirical psychological factors. But, for Kant, this is not the case. In
Allison’s words, “such a subject is, therefore, more properly characterized as a patient rather than an
agent”. (Allison [1996], p.130). To think of human rational agency as an arbitrium liberum means
that inclinations and desires are not direct causes of actions. The rational human agent deliberately
and spontaneously decides to incorporate motives, even though the agent is aware of desires and
inclinations.  Being  aware  of  desires  and  inclinations  does  not  means  that  they  have  a  causal
function in the deliberative and decision-making process. The agent can freely incorporate or not
incorporate a motive as a maxim or a rule and, and choose or act according to them.  Allison
understands  the  act  of  incorporation  as  a  genuine  causal  factor  for  any  rational  human  action
(Allison [1990]). Thus, the incorporation is an efficient cause of the choice or action for a rational
human agent. Therefore, it must take place in a certain period of time which starts a causal series.
But the incorporation itself is not the result of previous causes. It initiates by itself (as a spontaneous
or uncaused cause) a new causal series. This type of causality, causality through freedom, can be
thought only as an intelligible character of the human power of choice. 
We must emphasize that the Incorporation Thesis is based on the absolute spontaneity of the
arbitrium, without  any  empirical  causal  influence.  Therefore,  it  requires  an  absolute  kind  of
freedom, which does not presuppose any previous merely physical or empirically psychological
cause,  which Kant  calls  “transcendental  freedom.” The incorporation of  a  motive as a  rule  for
rational human choice and action starts a new causal series. This condition of absolute freedom of
the agent is more restrictive then the condition required to the solution of FOCL in Bell experiments
with human choices. As was shown by Hall [2010], the complete independence between the hidden
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variables λ and settings variables x and y is not required. The level of tolerance for the measurement
independence condition is low (indeed, it was even calculated by  Hall [2010]) but it is not null.
Therefore, when one accepts that the settings variables are defined by human choices, these choices
would  not  necessarily  have  to  be  absolutely  free.  One  could  consider  a  degree  (very  low)  of
dependence between the hidden variables  and human choices and still  close the FOCL. In this
sense, the specifically Kantian position on the freedom of rational human agents is more restrictive
then the condition required to close FOCL with human choices.
As regards merely physical causality, the Kantian position is also more restrictive than Bell’s
position.  Kant holds that merely physical causality is deterministic,  while in Bell’s theorem the
causality  can  be  taken  as  probabilistic.  Kant’s  theory  of  rational  human  agency  requires  the
compatibility of absolute noumenal freedom and merely physical phenomenal causal determinism.
These Kantian conditions are stronger than those associated with the application of human choice to
close  FOCL.  In  the  latter,  what  is  required  is  compatibility  of  a  quasi-absolute  freedom  (as
demonstrated  in the works of Hall [2011]; Degorre et al [2005]; Hall [2010]) and probabilistic or
indeterministic causality. Therefore, Kant’s theory of agency is better suited to support the free will
assumption in (Abellán et al [2018]), because it is able to resolve more serious inconsistencies.
The Kantian solution that allows the compatibility between absolute noumenal freedom and
merely  physical  phenomenal  causal  determinism  cannot  be  easily  classified  as  either
“compatibilist”  or  “incompatibilist”  in  the  traditional  sense.  This  is  a  matter  of  debate  among
interpreters (Hanna [2006]; Wood [1984]; Allison [1990]). The peculiarity of Kantian position is
noted  by  Robert  Hanna  as  follows:  “Kant’s  libertarian  theory  of  freedom  of  the  will  is
philosophically significant precisely because it is neither hard determinist, nor soft determinist, nor
causal indeterminist, nor hard indeterminist, nor compatibilist, nor incompatibilist.” (Hanna, [2006],
p.419). This because, on the one hand, the absolute noumenal freedom required by Kant’s solution
is not compatible with deterministic merely physical phenomenal causality, and, on the other hand,
the introduction of a conceptual space—i.e., noumenal space--free from empirical causality allows
Kant to claim that causality through freedom is not in direct causal competition with empirical
causality.  In  this  sense,  nature and freedom are not  in  direct  opposition but  can be thought  as
yielding causal series which are compatible but not in any way reducible or otherwise assimilable to
each other. Therefore, this view is sometimes called Kant’s “incompatibilistic compatibilism.”
In conclusion, we argue that the alternative for closing the FOCL through the hypothesis of
free will can find philosophical support in Kant’s theory of rational human agency. By promoting an
“incompatibilistically compatibilist” approach to the relation between freedom and nature, Kant’s
theory provides philosophical support for the central hypothesis of the experiment carried out in
(Abellán et al. [2018]). The requirement that the capacity of the rational human agent for choosing
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the directions of the measurement setup free from any causal influence, is fulfilled by Kant’s theory
of rational human agency. According to Allison’s interpretation, the incorporation of a motive as a
rule for choice and an action has efficient causal power even though it is not merely physically or
empirically psychologically caused by previous events. In other words, it has no phenomenal causal
history.  It  is  a  spontaneous  cause  that  starts  a  new series  of  phenomenal  events.  This  kind  of
causality through freedom is exactly what validates the use of human choices, as free choices, to
decide the directions of the measures in the experiment. Therefore, his Kantian philosophical point
of view enables us to conclude that rational human agency is the right candidate for closing the
FOCL. 
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